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In 1997 Mexico introduced Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) which, after a transition 
phase, will completely replace the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. We give a detailed overview 
of the relevant institutional framework, the market of PRA providers and how it has evolved 
since the 1997 reform.  We use administrative data obtained from CONSAR, the regulatory 
agency of the PRA system to assess how pension fund management fees affect pension 



















    
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of individual or personal retirement accounts (PRA) has been 
considered as one important reform option for the U.S. Social Security program.  There are 
a number of issues related to PRA schemes that make studying other countries’ experiences 
with PRAs highly instructive for policy makers in the U.S. in order to avoid certain pitfalls 
of implementation, should this option be considered further, or to add policy designs that 
remedy some disadvantages. For example, PRA schemes in their purest form do not leave 
room for redistribution.  Mexico has implemented a minimum pension benefit to provide 
for those with otherwise insufficient pension income.  
The PRA design in Mexico is based on three pillars: first, a flat rate minimum floor 
that is the minimum pension guaranteed by the government; second, personal retirement 
accounts managed by private pension fund managers, and third, voluntary saving accounts 
for retirement (World Bank, 1994). In the case of public pension systems, in the pure 
design of defined benefit (DB) plans, the risk is borne by the government. The PRA system 
distributes the risk of saving for retirement in a different way compared to DB schemes. In 
the first pillar, the government bears the risk for lower-income workers guaranteeing a 
minimum pension for those most disadvantaged in the labor market. The second pillar, 
introduces financial instruments for saving for retirement and the risk is borne by the 
employee. The third pillar provides complementary saving options to the mandatory second 
pillar for saving for retirement with the benefit of tax advantages.  In the U.S. tax favored 
voluntary saving options have been available in the form of 401(k) plans and Individual 
Retirement Accounts for over 30 years.   
In 1997 Mexico introduced Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) which, after a 
transition phase, will completely replace the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. We use 
administrative data obtained from CONSAR, the regulatory agency of the PRA system to 
assess how pension fund management fees affect outcomes. 
We find that fees drain pension accumulations by up to 25 percent of what would 
have been accumulated without fees. As a result many individuals, especially of the 
transition generation, will receive only the minimum pension guarantee because their 
accumulations will not be sufficient to fund a higher pension. The extent of this happening 
is important to gauge the additional cost to the government.  Irrespective of the  
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accumulated pension balances, the fees lower well-being during retirement, in some cases 
significantly so. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview of the 
institutional framework in Mexico. The third section describes the PRA system, the 
evolution of pension fund managers and their market shares, fee structures, switching 
behavior of individuals in the system, interest rates, and investment portfolio composition. 
Section 4 presents the analysis of the impact of fees on the accumulation of pension funds. 
Finally, we offer a brief conclusion and discussion. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
  In Mexico, social security is mainly provided by the Mexican Social Security 
Institute (IMSS) for private sector workers and the State Workers Security and Social 
Services Institute (ISSSTE) for public sector employees. In 1997, the Mexican Social 
Security Institute (IMSS) reformed the PAYG pension system to be transitioned to a fully 
funded system based on personal retirement accounts (PRA). The Mexican Social Security 
Institute covers private sector workers who account for 38 percent of the labor force in 
Mexico. ISSSTE reformed its PAYG system into a PRA system in March 2007 that covers 
approximately 5.7% of the labor force. In this study we focus on IMSS pension system 
because the reform was implemented 11 years ago and this social security institute has the 
highest coverage of the labor force.  
The PRAs are managed by private retirement fund managers (AFORES). The 
reform affected all workers who had not yet claimed their public pension as off July 1
st, 
1997. Workers who contributed previously to the PAYG can choose at the time of 
retirement whether to claim benefits under the PAYG or the PRA regime.
1 We refer to 
these individuals as the transition generation. The IMSS computes the PAYG pension and 
the pension fund manager presents the PRA options of annuitization or scheduled 
withdrawals provided by insurance companies. The individual has 30 days to notify IMSS 
and the pension fund manager of the decision to opt for the PAYG or PRA. Workers who 
started contributing to the pension system after 1997 can only retire under the PRA rules 
(Aguila, 2000; Aguila, 2008). We refer to these individuals as the new generation. 
                                                 
1 This is the case as long as they satisfy the minimum requirements to claim a pension in the PRA plan. Those 
persons that do not meet the requirements of the PRA system can only retire under the PAYG scheme.  
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The PRA system in the Mexican case has some redistributive components: a) a 
monthly social quota deposited in the individual account, equivalent to 5.55% of the 
minimum wage of Mexico City, and b) a minimum pension guarantee equivalent to the 
minimum wage. Individuals obtain an annuity of at least the minimum wage of Mexico 
City. Chile was the first country to introduce this type of pension reform from a PAYG to 
PRA. The Chilean pension system includes some redistributive components such as the 
minimum pension guarantee and a guaranteed minimum rate of return for pension funds. In 
the Chilean case, the minimum pension guarantee represents approximately 62% of the 
minimum wage but in Mexico, the minimum pension guarantee is equivalent to a 100% of 
the minimum wage. Mexico does not have a guaranteed minimum rate of return for pension 
funds, but the government contributes to individuals’ accounts the equivalent of 0.425 
percent of a worker’s wage and the monthly social quota (Aguila, Attanasio, and 
Quintanilla, 2008). In the Mexican case, employees bear all the financial risk with a lower 
bound provided by the minimum pension guarantee. 
To qualify for a pension under the PRA system a worker has to contribute for a 
minimum of 1,250 weeks which is approximately 25 years. The PAYG required only 500 
weeks (approximately 10 years), and the normal retirement age is 65 in both PAYG and 
PRA. Early retirement is possible in the PRA system from age 60 if the individual has a 
sufficient balance in the individual account to obtain a pension at least equivalent to the 
minimum pension guarantee. Early retirement at any age is available when the person can 
fund a pension of at least 130% of the minimum pension guarantee with the funds in the 
personal retirement account. The PRA system completely changes retirement incentives. 
This rule abolishes the notion of a normal or early retirement age for those that have saved 
enough to obtain a pension at least equivalent to 130% of the minimum pension guarantee.
2 
In the PAYG system, for each year that a person retires before the normal retirement age 
pension benefits are reduced by 5%. At age 60 pension benefits reduced for early 
retirement amount to 75% of the normal retirement pension. 
Contributions to the pension system are defined as a percentage of workers’ 
earnings. The employer, employee and government contribute to the pension system. The 
                                                 
2 In the Chilean case, there is also no particular retirement age for those individuals who can finance a 
pension of 150% of the minimum pension guarantee. This seems a stricter requirement than in the Mexican 
case but the minimum pension guarantee in Chile is worth less than 100% of the minimum wage (Aguila, 
Attanasio, and Quintanilla, 2008).   
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employee and employer contributions did not change after the pension reform, remaining at 
10.075 percent of a worker’s wage. The government contribution to the PAYG was 0.425 
percent of a worker’s wage. With the introduction of the PRA the government contributes 
the social quota equivalent to 5.55% in addition to the 0.425 percent of worker’s wage.  
The government agency in charge of monitoring the performance of the PRA 
system in Mexico is the National Commission of Saving for Retirement (CONSAR) 
founded in 1994. In the next section we explore the administrative records of the 
performance of the PRA system obtained from CONSAR. 
 
3. PERSONAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS SYSTEM 
  In this section we focus in the second pillar of the Mexican PRA system, which 
consists of the personal retirement accounts managed by pension fund managers. We 
describe the evolution of the number of pension fund managers, fees charged to the 
individual retirement accounts by pension fund managers, switching behavior of 
participants of the system, and the rate of return and investment portfolio of pension funds.  
  In February 2008, the PRA system in Mexico had 38.8 million participants. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of registered persons from 1998 to 2008. The 
number of participants has increased at an average monthly rate of 1.0 percent.  Table 1 
presents the number of participants by pension fund manager. Many AFORES started 
operations between 2004 and 2006. It is important to highlight that the PRA system reports 
the number of accounts in the system but some of the accounts are not active. Mexico has a 
high turn-over of labor and constant migration between the formal and informal sectors. 
This causes some workers to contribute only for short periods of time in the formal sector. 
As a result there is a large difference between the number of registered persons and those 
contributing. According to the latest available figures from CONSAR 83% of persons 
registered were actively contributing to the system in July 2003.
3  
  The amount accumulated in the PRA system has grown in importance. Table 2 
shows the amount accumulated in the PRA system from 2000 to 2008 for mandatory and 
voluntary contributions. Voluntary contributions are still a small fraction compared to 
                                                 
3 Aguila, Attanasio and Quintanilla (2008) show that the gap between persons registered and those 
contributing grows considerably from 1997 to 2005. By 2004, only 51.5% of persons registered to the PRA 
system are actually contributing.   
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mandatory saving.  These figures illustrate the growing importance of PRAs in 
transitioning towards a funded pension system.   
 
3.1 Evolution of Pension Fund Managers and their Market Share  
  The PRA system started in July 1997 with 17 pension fund managers (AFORES). 
From 1997 to 2002, those with the lowest market share merged with some of the existent 
AFORES. In December 2003, only 11 AFORES remained.
4  After that date the number of 
AFORES gradually started to increase again. In December 2005, there were 13 AFORES. 
The number of AFORES continued to increase in 2005 and 2006. By December 2007, the 
system had 21 AFORES.  
  García and Rodríguez (2003) find that there are economies of scale in the Mexican 
pension fund managers industry contributing to the decline in the number of AFORES. 
When there are economies of scale, larger pension fund managers will always have a 
comparative advantage over smaller ones. In this case market shares should be regulated to 
promote competition and allow lower coverage pension fund managers to develop. In a 
later study Aguilera and Velázquez (2005) find that most firms have crossed the minimum 
average cost of production and therefore no economies of scale exist in the Mexican 
case. The authors mention that part of this was achieved by the 2001 regulatory change 
assigning workers who had not chosen an AFORE to the pension fund with the lowest fees. 
This measure has allowed small pension fund managers to grow and consolidate in the 
market.  
Table 3 shows the market share of some of the main AFORES. We observe that the 
market was more concentrated at the beginning of 1998. Banamex, Bancomer, and 
Profuturo GNP had more than 11% of the market share. Bancomer had the highest share of 
the market (16.1 %). More than two years after the system started, by December 2001, 
market concentration stayed the same; Bancomer, Banamex, and Profuturo GNP had more 
than 10% of the market share. Diversification increased by 2004 but the main AFORES, 
Bancomer and Banamex maintained their leading position in the market. Bancomer and 
                                                 
4  Mesa-Lago (2005) shows that the reduction in the number of pension fund mangers following their 
introduction has been observed in other countries as well. Some examples are Argentina moved from 25 to 




Banamex have been historically the banks with the highest coverage in Mexico. Bancomer 
has 1,341 branches all over Mexico and Banamex has 1,264.  
In December 2007, Banamex and Bancomer have the highest market share, 15.3 % 
and 11.5%, respectively. All other AFORES have a market share below 10%. Another 
AFORE with the highest coverage in terms of branches in Mexico is HSBC that merged 
with a Bank called “Bital”. The AFORE of HSBC started only in February 2004 and 
gained a market share of 4.7 % by December 2007. The bank HSBC counts 1,446 branches 
in Mexico. Solida Banorte Generali has also wide coverage in Mexico with 946 branches. 
It is worth noting that Inbursa has 8.9 % of the market but has only 64 branches to provide 
services. Also AFORE XXI, has 7.0 % of the market share and 48 branches. ING has 67 
branches. Inbursa, AFORE XXI, and ING have branches mainly in Mexico City and other 
main cities in Mexico. It seems that the market shares are more even in Mexico City but 
there is a higher concentration in Banamex and Bancomer because they capture workers in 
other towns outside Mexico City due to their wider coverage. 
 
3.2 PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT FEES AND PARTICIPANT SWITCHING 
BEHAVIOR 
The PRA system regulates the types of fees that financial institutions can charge.  It 
has allowed three types of fees: load factor, fees charged on the account balance, and fees 
charged on the accrued interest.
5 Other countries also allow fixed fees. Even though these 
types of fees are the most important source of revenue for pension fund managers, there are 
other fees for services such deposits and withdrawals from voluntary savings accounts 
allowing them to create the fee system that positions them best in the market.  Such a fee 
system may or may not be related to the cost structure faced by the firm (Barrientos and 
Boussofiane, 2005) nor to the performance of the pension funds (Crabbe, 2005). For most 
countries however, fees are set as a percentage of contributions.  Few countries set fixed 
fees – sometimes in addition to the percentage charged on contributions - and in other cases 
in addition to fees charged on the account balance (Crabbe, 2005). 
Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show the evolution of the load factor, balance, and 
interest fees, respectively, from 1998 to 2008. We observe changes over time in these fees. 
                                                 
5 In the case of Chile, pension fund managers are allowed to either charge a fixed sum or a variable 




They are partly a result of changes in the regulatory framework mandating increased 
information and transparency.  
Table 4 shows load factor fees by main pension fund managers. In May load factor 
fees were between 0.0% and 1.7% (see Figure 2). It is important to point out that the way 
load factor fees are quoted makes them appear very small when in fact they translate into 
very high fees.  We will illustrate this with an example:  take a worker who earns $1,000.  
Total contributions amount to 6.5% of salary or $65.  A load factor fee of 1 percent is 
applied to the contributed amount divided by 6.5%:  ($65 / 0.065) x 1 % = $10.  If the load 
factor were quoted as a percentage of the contribution, as is customary in the U.S., it would 
have to be quoted as 15.4 percent.  A load factor of 1.5% in the Mexican PRA system 
translates into a load factor of 23% in the U.S. context.  The pension fund managers 
(AFORES) charging the lowest load factor fees in 1998, started increasing fees towards the 
end of 1998 and continued to do so until 2002. In December 1999, load factor fees for 
those AFORES charging them were between 1.35% and 1.7%, and in December 2002 they 
were between 1.45% and 1.7%. By the end of 2002, load factor fees had a lower variance 
converging towards the highest fee charged in the market by Banamex (1.7%).  
Since December 2003, load factor fees started to decline (see Table 4). By 
December 2003, load factor fees were between 0.5% and 1.7%. This decline was due to a 
change in the regulatory framework. AFORES had to send out PRA statements at least 
once a year. In October 2002, this changed to at least twice a year, and the statement had to 
provide information about employee contributions, and fees charged by the AFORE. 
Moreover, the switching mechanism between AFORES became more flexible. In 
December 2003, 2.4% of the persons registered in the PRA system were switching between 
AFORES (see Figure 5). 
Therefore, the decline in load factor fees may be due to a more detailed statement 
providing information about fees and prompting employees to switch more actively 
between pension fund managers in response to the information provided.  Some AFORES 
do not charge a load factor fee.  For example, Inbursa did not charge load factor or balance 
fees until December 2003. Before December 2003, Inbursa only charged a fee on the 
accrued interest of 33.0% (see Table 4). 
Between 2003 and 2005 load factor fees stayed relatively stable.  Those AFORES 
that changed them only increased or decreased fees slightly (see Figure 2). Banamex had  
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the highest load factor fee from 1998 to 2003 (1.70%). Bancomer had the second highest 
load factor fee (1.68%) from to 2003. Profuturo GNP started with a load factor fee of 
1.70 % that stayed in place until July 1999, then decreased to 1.64 % by December 2006, 
and continued its decline down to 1.60 % in December 2007.  
AFORES with the highest market share had higher load factor fees (see Table 3). It 
is clear that a higher concentration of the market is not conducive to declining fees and 
enhancing competition. More transparency in the employee statement and detailed 
information of the system appears to have increased switching behavior and competition 
between AFORES. Individuals’ switching behavior may depend on the fees charged by 
AFORES as well as on the tendency to move to those with the highest market share or 
those available in their home town.  
From December 2006, load factor fees decreased more sharply. In December 2007, 
load factor fees were between 0.5% and 1.6%. Banamex decreased the load factor fee to 
0.75%. Profuturo GNP and Confia Principal have the highest load factor fee (1.6 %). The 
main change in the regulatory framework in November 2005 was to include penalties for 
AFORES if they  
-  requested employees to switch the individual account without his or her consent,  
-  failed to disclose information about the individual account to the employee, or  
-  charged fees exceeding the allowed limits.
6   
 
   The regulatory framework may have changed due to a large volume of complaints 
in 2005 about AFORES not complying with the regulation, charging fees incorrectly and 
not providing information about the individual account to workers. This also may have 
negatively affected customers’ trust in the operations of the AFORES and AFORES may 
have responded by decreasing their fees. Moreover, the number of AFORES rose 
substantially since 2005, increasing market competition and causing part of the decline in 
fees during this period.  
In Figure 5 we present the fraction of persons switching per month. We observe a 
sharp increase of switchers since October 2001. The Mexican regulation established that 
beginning in 2001, workers who did not choose a pension fund manager were assigned by 
                                                 
6 Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el Retiro, Article 100.  
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the government to those AFORES with the highest return net of fees.
7 Figure 1 shows the 
resulting 36% increase in the number of persons registered in the PRA system in June 2001 
reflecting the change in the regulatory framework.  
The fraction of switchers in the PRA system has increased steadily, reaching 5.4% 
of the total number of persons registered in January 2008, which amounts to more than two 
million switchers. Also the number of persons registered in the PRA system has increased 
significantly. In Figure 1, we observe that in May 1998, the PRA system had 12.4 million 
individual accounts. In December 2004, the number of individual retirement accounts 
increased to 31.4 million, and by December 2008, there were 38.5 million accounts. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of fees charged on account balances. In May 1998 
balance fees were between 0.0% and 1.5%. Solida Banorte Generali charged the highest 
balance fee. Since December 1999 balance fees started to decline, converging towards an 
average of 0.35% in December 2006. The AFORES charging the highest balance fees were 
Banamex (1.48%), Bancomer (0.5%), Inbursa (0.5%) and Profuturo GNP (0.5%). Many 
more AFORES started charging balance fees beginning in March 2003 and by February 
2006 most AFORES charged a balance fee. Table 5 shows the balance fees for the main 
pension fund managers. 
Figure 4 shows the market structure of fees charged on accrued interest. In May 
1998 only two AFORES charged interest fees, Atlantico Promex (20%) and Inbursa (33%) 
(see Table 6). Atlantico Promex merged with Principal in November 1998. Inbursa was the 
only one charging an interest fee until March 2003.  
Another factor playing a role in retaining workers in a particular pension fund is the 
provision of discounts on fees due to tenure with the fund. The first AFORES to implement 
such discount schemes included Banamex and Bancomer. These discounts consisted of 
decreasing load factor fees by 0.01% or 0.02% or 0.05% per year after being with the same 
fund between two to five years. By the year 2006 most AFORES had adopted discount 
schemes to increase customer loyalty by making switching more costly. Some AFORES 
completely eliminate the load factor fee after 25 years of tenure.  As a result switching 
between pension funds managers is less desirable because that causes a loss in tenure and 
the associated fees discounts.  
                                                 
7 Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el Retiro, Article 76.  
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In Table 7 we show the rules of discounts valid from 1998 to 2007 for Banamex, 
Bancomer, Profuturo GNP, and Inbursa pension fund managers. This table includes two of 
the pension fund managers (Banamex, and Bancomer) with the highest market share. 
Profuturo GNP had a high market share in 1998, comparable to Banamex and Bancomer, 
but coverage declined substantially by 2007. We include Inbursa, a pension fund with a 
low market share in 1998 which caught up reaching coverage just below the two biggest 
pension funds but above Profuturo GNP by 2007. We observe in Table 7 that Profuturo 
GNP only started granting discounts in November 2002, five years after the PRA system 
started. Profuturo GNP has a more generous discount system than any other pension fund 
and still this AFORE was less successful at retaining registered individuals and attracting 
new participants.  
  Summarizing patterns of retention and attracting individuals registered in other 
pension funds, Table 8 shows the net number of switchers for selected pension funds. 
Banamex has a successful history of attracting individuals from other pension funds in 
excess of the number of participants leaving Banamex (see Tables 9 and 10). Bancomer 
from 2003 to 2006 had difficulties retaining enrollees. Inbursa has had a history of losing 
more persons than gaining individuals switching from other AFORES. Profuturo GNP 
since 2002 has been successful both in retaining and attracting individuals. Table 9 shows 
the leavers by main pension fund managers and Table 10 shows individuals that moved 
from other pension fund managers. We find that the dynamics of attracting new system 
participants can be quite different from those of individuals switching between pension 
funds. The increase in the market share of Inbursa is mainly due to new entries to the 
system but is has a poorer performance in terms of retention and attracting persons 
registered in other pension funds. 
  There are many factors that influence individuals’ choice of pension fund manager 
such as the number of branches, fees, discounts for tenure as well as aspects related to the 
company’s sales strategy. Calderón, Domínguez and Schwartz (2008) find for the Mexican 
case switching behavior responds more to sales strategies of AFORES than to price 
competition in the period from 1997 to 2006. Calderón, Domínguez and Schwartz calculate 
that resulting from uninformed individuals switching pension funds, 52.8% of transfers in 
2006 resulted in lower pensions. Marketing is assumed to be an important determinant in 
the early stages of a new system which fades later on when individuals learn more about  
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the rules and are closer to retirement age. Whether this is also true for the Mexican case 
would be interesting to investigate.  For example, one might compare the switching 
behavior of younger cohorts with that of older cohorts.  Similarly, one might compare the 
choices of younger new entrants to those of older new entrants.  
 
3.3 RATES OF RETURN AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 
The investment portfolio of AFORES is highly regulated. At the time when the 
PRA system was introduced, there was only one authorized investment portfolio that 
mandated that most of the funds had to be invested in government bonds. Table 11 shows 
that in December 2000, government bonds represented 96% of the investment portfolio of 
AFORES. Investment in international financial instruments was not allowed until April 
2005. Table 11 shows that since their introduction the proportion of government bonds in 
the investment portfolios has decreased and the proportion of non-government and 
international instruments has increased. Nevertheless, in December 2007, 69% of the 
portfolios of AFORES were still invested in government bonds.  
In 2004, there were two authorized investment portfolios (Siefore Básica 1 and 
Siefore Básica 2). Siefore Básica 1 mainly prescribed investment in risk free assets 
designed for individuals close to retirement age and Siefore Básica 2 allowed investment in 
riskier financial instruments with higher expected returns designed for younger cohorts. 
Since 2008, the number of authorized investment portfolios has risen to 5 intended to offer 
suitable investment options for different age groups.   Siefore Básica 1 is for individuals 
age 56 or older, Siefore Básica 2 for individuals between age 46 and 55, Siefore Básica 3 
for persons between 37 and 45 years old, Siefore Básica 4 includes those between 27 and 
36 years old, and Siefore Básica 5 is for persons up to age 26.  The investment returns are 
least risky for Siefore Básica 1 and most risky for Siefore Básica 5. All investment 
portfolios allow foreign instruments. Individuals cannot choose between Siefores unless 
they want to decrease the risk of the investment portfolio. Chile has also five investment 
portfolios with different levels of risk but the concentration of government bonds was only 
7.8% in December 2007 (AIOS, 2007).  
In Figure 6, we present the real rate of return of AFORES for Siefore Básica 1 from 
1998 to 2007 without adjusting for fees.  For every month we show the median, highest and 
lowest rate of return and include for comparison a line for the real rate of return of the  
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Mexican Treasury Bills, CETES.  Table 12 shows the associated real rates of return before 
fees by main pension funds. We find that between 1998 and 2005 the highest, median and 
lowest values are not all that different from each other.  Also, there is very little difference 
in fund performance by pension fund manager (Table 12). The average real rate of return is 
7.3% and the standard deviation is 0.63. From December 2006, we observe an increased 
variability in the real rates of return . The average real rate of return from December 2006 
to December 2007 is 6.6% and the standard deviation is 1.30.  
Comparing the real rate of return of the AFORES with that of the leading Mexican 
Treasury Bills, CETES, in Figure 6 we note that from 1998 to 2003 there appears to be 
amazingly little correlation between the two; in fact, they appear to move in opposite 
directions much of the time.  This is surprising because during that period the authorized 
portfolio mandated an investment share in government bonds of more than 95 percent.  
This may be due to the composition of government bonds held by the AFORES, possibly 
being heavily concentrated in indexed-linked bonds government bonds.  We have not yet 
been able to confirm this.  Since 2003, the real rate of return of CETES and the AFORES 
follow the same trends and are quite comparable.  
As mentioned before another investment portfolio was authorized in 2004: the 
Siefore Básica 2, with riskier returns than those associated with Siefore Básica 1. In Figure 
7 we show the real rate of return of Siefore Básica 1 and Siefore Básica 2 in comparison 
from 2004 to 2007. Table 13 shows the corresponding real rates of return for Siefore 
Básica 2 by main pension fund. The median real rate of return of Siefore Básica 1 and 
Siefore Básica 2 follow the same trend in 2004. From 2004 onwards there is a higher 
variability in the median and the highest real rate of return of Siefore Básica 2. Note that 
the minimum real rate of return is very similar in both investment portfolios. The standard 
deviation for Siefore Básica 2 is 1.25 and for Siefore Básica 1 it is 1.00.  
 
4. IMPACT OF FEES ON PRA SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
 
  In this section we analyze the impact of pension fund management fees on PRA 
social security benefits. As described in the previous section, pension fund management 
fees have undergone drastic changes from 1997 to 2007. We assess the importance of the 
different types of fees for the accumulation of pension funds for a median worker. A  
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median worker earns three times the minimum wage that is equivalent to $345 dollars per 
month. The monthly minimum wage in Mexico City is $115 dollars. 
  We assume a real rate of return of pension funds before fees of 5.44%, which is a 
historic average. The monthly contribution to the PRA is equivalent to 6.5% of a worker’s 
wage including employer, employee, and government contribution. Additionally, the 
government deposits the social quota amounting to $6.3 per month. We assume the median 
worker starts contributing to the PRA system in May 1998, when we start observing 
pension fund management fees. Load factor fees are charged as a fraction of the worker’s 
salary and balance fees are charged annually. 
  We estimate the amount accumulated in the PRA system for a median worker in 
each pension fund. We apply the exact fee schedule for each pension fund manager taking 
into account all the different types of fees, including discounts. The baseline scenario 
assumes no fees are charged. We compute the loss due to fees for each pension fund 
expressed in percent of the balance that would have accumulated without fees.  That is 
every period we take the difference between the accumulation in a particular pension fund 
with fees and without fees, and divide by the scenario without fees. Changes in the slope of 
the loss in pension funds reflect changes in fees. 
  In Figure 8 we show the loss on pension balances due to load factor fees for a 
median worker.  For balances with several AFORES the loss amounts to as much as 20 
percent due to this load factor alone.  We observe that the loss has not changed for most 
pension funds and for some it has even increased.  This is the case for Sólida Banorte 
Generali and Confía Principal, for example.  Even though we observed a decline in load 
factor fees in Figure 2 this translates into a constant or slightly increasing loss at decreasing 
rates over time. The median loss was 19.2% in May 1998. The minimum load factor fee 
loss is around zero because Inbursa only charged an interest fee but started charging a load 
factor fee in June 2003. The highest load factor fee loss pertains to Banamex, Bancomer, 
ING, and Profuturo GNP. Banamex and Bancomer have been consistently AFORES with 
the highest market share. This may indicate that many individuals are not aware of the 
impact of load factor fees on their accumulations and therefore fail to consider these in 
their decision to join or switch to a particular pension fund. The standard deviation of the 
loss due to load factor fees is 5.4 in January 2008.  
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  Figure 9 shows the losses in pension accumulations due to fees charged on the 
account balance. They are small initially, but increasing over time. The rate of increase is 
somewhat smaller between 2002 and 2005. There is substantial heterogeneity across 
pension funds in the loss resulting from balance fees. The minimum balance fee is around 
zero as Banamex, Bancomer, HSBC, and Inbursa only started charging this fee after 2003. 
The highest balance fee pertains to Sólida Banorte Generali. In December 1998, the 
standard deviation was 0.56 but it declines to 0.25 in October 1999.  
  The loss in pension accumulations as a result of interest fees is noticeable, even 
though far short of the losses due to load factor fees (see Figure 10). Only two pension 
funds charged interest fees: Inbursa and Atlántico Promex. The latter merged with Confía 
Principal in November 1998. Inbursa charged an interest fee from 1998 until May 2003. 
The interest fee for Inbursa was 33.0%. We observe in Figure 10 a loss of 0.1% of pension 
accumulations in May 1998 for a median worker registered with Inbursa, but this loss 
reaches 4.5% in May 2003. It declines slowly after May 2003 because Inbursa stopped 
charging this type of fee.  
  Figure 11 shows the loss in pension accumulations due to load factor fees taking 
into account discounts for tenure. Discounts start from two years of tenure in Bancomer 
and from five years of tenure in most other AFORES. The savings resulting from these 
discounted fees are very small reducing the loss by 0.15% on average in December 2007. It 
follows that they have practically no impact on the real incentives to stay with a particular 
pension fund. The highest discounts for tenure in December 2007 are granted by Bancomer 
and Profuturo GNP. Bancomer’s discount for tenure reduces the loss in pension 
accumulations by 0.39%; the corresponding figure for Profuturo GNP is 0.40%.  Even 
though the real impact of fee discounts is negligible AFORES may still have been able to 
use them as a marketing tool to influence participants’ choices.   
  Discounts may play a more important role in the future. Since 2007, they have 
contributed to declining load factor fees in an important way. Before 2007, discounts 
reduced load factor fees to a minimum rate of approximately 1%, while after 2007 load 
factor fees could be reduced to about 0.50% or lower in most AFORES when taking into 
account discounts for tenure.  
  In Figure 12 we show the loss in pension accumulations due to all types of fees 
combined (load factor, balance, and interest fee) for a median worker.  In May 1998, the  
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lowest loss in pension accumulations was 0.1% of the amount that would have been 
accumulated without fees. This fraction rises to 7.0% in January 2008. The lowest loss is 
for a worker registered with Inbursa. The slope of the loss with Inbursa increases after the 
interest fee is eliminated and other fees were adopted. 
  The highest loss in pension accumulations affects clients of Profuturo GNP (23.2% 
in January 2008). This is mainly due to the load factor fee. The second highest loss in 
accumulations would be experienced with Banamex. Confia Principal and ING occupy the 
third place in terms of loss of pension accumulations with 19.8% in January 2008.  
  
   
Conclusions 
  In this paper we document that fees as they have been charged by AFORES in the 
Mexican PRA system have a large impact on individuals’ pension accumulations, draining 
personal retirement accounts by up to almost a quarter of the amount that they would have 
accumulated without fees. Thus, it is extremely important to pay attention to the design of 
fees when designing PRA systems and when studying how such a reform might affect 
economic preparation for retirement. In the Mexican there are three different types of fees 
(load factor, balance and interest) that need to be taken into account.  The greatest losses 
are due to the load factor, however. 
  To enhance transparency for individuals it would appear advisable restrict the types 
of fees to one common one to be used by all pension funds.  Understanding the long-term 
consequences of just one type of fee is not a straightforward exercise for individuals.   
  Furthermore, for Latin American countries the structure of fees is generally not 
based on costs (Crabbe (2005) and Devesa et al. (2002)) with the implication that 
competition has not resulted in a rational system of fees.  These findings are similar to Soto 
(2005) for the Chilean case who finds that more than a fifth of pension accumulations are 
lost due to management fees. Fees include administrative costs and competition costs, sales 
personnel, differentiation, and advertisement (Crabbe, 2005).  This last element has led 
analysts to conclude that competition has not lead to reduced costs but instead to increased 
costs, eliminating economies of scale created by a large provider (Gill et al. 2008). In Chile 
other costs such as sales increased substantially during the 1990s since it proved to be the 
best strategy for firms to retain and increase market share (Barrientos, 2005).    
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  In future research, we will compare retirement benefits under the old pay-as-you-go 
and the new PRA system. We will assess the effects of fees on the different cohorts 
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Table 1—Number of persons registered to the PRA system by pension fund 
managers from 2000 to 2007 
 
AFORE  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Banamex  2,248,343 2,640,629 5,269,868 5,612,068 5,822,157 5,691,283 5,596,232 5,909,937
Bancomer 2,868,189 3,740,168 4,353,848 4,328,805 4,324,299 4,287,401 4,255,568 4,414,395
Confia 
Principal  610,745  1,300,417 2,198,895 3,210,145 3,227,762 3,301,712 3,326,545 3,026,731
Ahorra       
Ahora  - - - - - - 155,942  377,994 
Argos  - - - - - - - 7,367 
Coppel  - - - - - - 203,834  358,770 
Scotia    - - - - - - 673  14,055 
Metlife  - - - - - 50,199  112,833  126,585 
HSBC  - - - - 1,431,790 1,698,619  1,767,775 1,829,670
Inbursa    391,024  1,095,802 1,933,297 2,120,961 2,510,861 3,252,331 3,630,280 3,424,203
ING  -  2,720,896 2,708,384 2,692,066 2,626,500 2,426,602 2,314,651 2,268,018
Azteca  - - - 446,676  821,973  1,206,945  1,270,951 1,134,693
Afirme 
Bajio  - - - - - 71  422,615  752,002 
Invercap  - - - - - 327,752  833,415  979,467 
IXE  - - - - 163,914  182,124  184,673  304,351 
Profuturo 
GNP  2,098,629 2,783,701 2,926,609 3,122,926 3,361,548 3,440,155 3,403,090 3,188,220
Solida 
Banorte 
Generali  1,581,480 2,400,764 2,610,791 2,784,732 2,901,588 3,044,085 3,282,539 3,281,580
XXI  579,099  1,300,417 1,982,478 2,218,455 2,212,863 2,286,349 2,402,682 2,698,172
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. – Refers to AFORES created after July 1997: Ahorra Ahora       
(Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife (Mar-2005), HSBC(Feb-2004),   
 ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-2004) 










Table 2—Amount accumulated in the PRA system for mandatory and voluntary 
contributions 
 
Date  Amount accumulated in the PRA 
system for mandatory 
contributions (millions of 
dollars) 
Amount accumulated in the 
PRA system for voluntary 
contributions (millions of 
dollars) 
December 2000  15,880.62  84.59 
December 2001  24,224.22  151.38 
December 2002  31,532.24  190.05 
December 2003  39,288.18  222.12 
December 2004  46,914.58  203.09 
December 2005  57,700.87  198.14 
December 2006  71,221.18  233.67 
December 2007  81,644.33  265.11 
                   NOTE: The exchange rate used is $10.00 pesos per dollar. 
                   SOURCE: Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR). 
 
 
Table 3— Market share by main pension fund managers from 2000 to 2007 (%) 
 
AFORE  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Banamex                 12.6  10.0 17.9 17.9 17.5 16.1 15.0 15.3 
Bancomer  16.1  14.1 14.8 13.8 13.0 12.2 11.4 11.5 
Confia  Principal  3.4  4.9 7.5 10.2  9.7 9.4 8.9 7.9 
Ahorra  Ahora  -  - - - - - 0.4  1.0 
Argos  -  - - - - - - 0.0 
Coppel  -  - - - - - 0.5  0.9 
Scotia  -  - - - - - 0.0  0.0 
Metlife  -  - - - - 0.1  0.3  0.3 
HSBC  -  - - - 4.3  4.8  4.7  4.7 
Inbursa  2.2  4.1 6.6 6.8 7.5 9.2 9.7 8.9 
ING  -  10.3  9.2 8.6 7.9 6.9 6.2 5.9 
Azteca  -  -  -  1.4 2.5 3.4 3.4 2.9 
Afirme  Bajio  -  - - - - 0.0  1.1  2.0 
Invercap  -  - - - - 0.9  2.2  2.5 
IXE  -  - - - 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.8 
Profuturo  GNP  11.8  10.5  9.9 9.9 10.1  9.8 9.1 8.3 
Solida  Banorte  Generali  8.9  9.1 8.9 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.8 8.5 
XXI  3.2  4.9 6.7 7.1 6.6 6.5 6.4 7.0 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. – Refers to AFORES created after July 1997: Ahorra 
Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife (Mar-2005), HSBC 
(Feb-2004),  ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-
2004). Percentages do not add up to 100% because we did not include AFORES that merged to other pension 
fund managers through this period. 








Table 4— Load factor fees by main pension fund managers from 2000 to 2007 (%) 
 
AFORE 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007 
Banamex  1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.75 0.75 
Bancomer  1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.20 1.20 
Confia  Principal  1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 
Ahorra  Ahora  - - - - - - 0.90  0.70 
Argos  - - - - - - - 0.97 
Coppel  - - - - - - 0.92  0.92 
Scotia  - - - - - - 1.22  1.22 
Metlife  - - - - - 1.23  1.23  1.20 
HSBC  - - - - 1.60  1.42  1.40  0.75 
Inbursa  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
ING  -  1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.32 0.70 
Azteca  -  -  -  1.10 1.10 1.10 0.90 0.90 
Afirme  Bajio  - - - - - 0.62  0.62  0.62 
Invercap  - - - - - 1.03  1.03  0.80 
IXE  - - - - 1.10  1.10  1.10  0.76 
Profuturo  GNP  1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.64 1.60 
Solida  Banorte  Generali  1.45 1.45 1.45 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.25 0.70 
XXI  1.45 1.45 1.45 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 0.60 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. – Refers to AFORES created after July 1997: Ahorra 
Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife (Mar-2005), 
HSBC (Feb-2004), ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), Invercap (Mar-
2005), IXE (Jul-2004). Load factor fees are computed as a percentage of worker’s wage. 
















Table 5— Balance fees by main pension fund managers from 2000 to 2007 (%) 
 
AFORE 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007 
Banamex  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.48 1.48 
Bancomer  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 
Confia  Principal  0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Ahorra  Ahora  - - - - - - 0.20  0.20 
Argos  - - - - - - - 0.12 
Coppel  - - - - - - 0.30  0.30 
Scotia    - - - - - - 0.26  0.26 
Metlife  - - - - - 0.25  0.25  0.71 
HSBC  - - - - 0.40  0.40  0.40  1.20 
Inbursa    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
ING  -  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.45 
Azteca  -  -  -  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.40 0.40 
Afirme  Bajio  - - - - - 0.25  0.24  0.23 
Invercap  - - - - - 0.20  0.20  0.36 
IXE  - - - - 0.35  0.34  0.33  0.25 
Profuturo  GNP  0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.50 0.50 1.20 
Solida  Banorte  Generali  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 1.14 
XXI  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.50 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. . – Refers to AFORES created after July 1997: 
Ahorra      Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife 
(Mar-2005), HSBC (Feb-2004), ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), 
Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-2004). Balance fees are an annual percentage. 










Table 6— Interest fees by main pension fund managers from 2000 to 2007 (%) 
 
AFORE 2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006  2007 
Banamex  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bancomer  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Confia  Principal  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ahorra  Ahora -  -  -  - - - 0.00  0.00 
Argos  -  -  -  - - - - 0.00 
Coppel  -  -  -  - - - 0.00  0.00 
Scotia    -  -  -  - - - 0.00  0.00 
Metlife  -  -  -  - - 0.00  0.00  0.00 
HSBC  -  -  -  -  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Inbursa    33.00  33.00 33.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ING  -  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Azteca  -  -  -  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Afirme  Bajio  -  -  -  - - 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Invercap  -  -  -  - - 0.00  0.00  0.00 
IXE  -  -  -  -  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Profuturo  GNP  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Solida Banorte 
Generali  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
XXI  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. – Refers to AFORES created after July 1997: 
Ahorra      Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife 
(Mar-2005), HSBC (Feb-2004), ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), 
Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-2004). 





Table 7—Discounts for selected pension fund managers from 1998 to 2007 
Banamex Bancomer  Profuturo  GNP  Inbursa 
From the 5
th year of tenure, 
the load factor fee will  be 
discounted 0.02% per year 
(valid up to September 2001) 
From the 2
nd year up to the 
6th of tenure, the load factor 
fee will  be discounted 




th year of tenure, 
the load factor fee will  be 
discounted 0.02% per year up 
to a max of 0.70% (valid up to 
December 2005) 
From the 2nd year of tenure, 
the load factor fee will  be 
discounted 0.01% per year 
up to a max 0.05% (valid up 
to September 2006) 
Started making discounts in 
November 2002. 
From 2003, after having 5 years of 
tenure, the load factor fee decreases 
by 0.04% per year up to a max of 10 
years (valid up to December 2004) 
Started making discounts in June 
2003. 
After 18 years of tenure the load 
factor fee is eliminated (valid up to 
December 2008) 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
After having 5 years of tenure, the 
load factor fee decreases by 0.04% 
per year up to a max of 10 years. 
After the 15
th year of tenure, load 
factor fee declines 0.05% until 
reaching 24 years of tenure. In the 
25
th year the  fee declines 
0.07%(valid up to May 2005) 
No changes, applies previous one. 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
After having 5 years of tenure, the 
load factor fee decreases by 0.50%. 
After the 10th year of tenure, load 
factor fee declines 0.04% per year 
until the 15th year of tenure. In the 
16th year of tenure the load factor 
fee declines 0.04% per year until 
24th year of tenure. In the 25th year 
the  fee declines 0.07%(valid up to 
August 2005) 












Cont. Table 7—Discounts for selected pension fund managers from 1998 to 2007 
Banamex Bancomer  Profuturo  GNP  Inbursa 
At the 4
th year of tenure, the 
load factor fee is discounted 
0.04%, from the 5
th to the 8
th 
year of tenure, 0.02% discount 
per year, from 9
th to the 11
th, 
an annual discount of 0.05%, 
a discount in the 12
th year of 
tenure by 0.10%, from the 14
th 
year of tenure, there is an 
annual average discount of 
0.08% until there is no load 
factor fee charged from the 
26
th year of tenure (valid up to  
October 2006)  
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
After having 5 years oftenure, the 
load factor fee decreases by 0.30%. 
In the 12
th year of tenure, load factor 
fee declines by 0.02%. In the 13
th 
and 14
th year of tenure the fee 
declines by 0.04% per year. From 
the 15
th year of tenure the load factor 
fee declines 0.04% per year until 
24th year of tenure. In the 25
th year 
the  fee declines 0.07%(valid up to 
December 2006) 
No changes, applies previous one. 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
After having 5 years of tenure, the 
load factor fee decreases by 0.44%. 
In the 16
th year of tenure, load factor 
fee declines by 0.04%. In the 17
th up 
to 23
rd year of tenure the fee 
declines by 0.05% per year. From 
the 24
th year of tenure the load factor 
fee declines 0.07% (valid up to July 
2006) 




th year of tenure, the 
load factor fee will be 
discounted 0.30%, and in the 
sixth the fee declines 0.20%. 
In the 11
th year of tenure, the 
load factor fee declines 0.05% 
(valid up to December 2008) 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
After having 5 years of tenure, the 
load factor fee decreases by 0.47%. 
In the 17
th up to 23
rd year of tenure 
the fee declines by 0.05% per year. 
From the 24
th year of tenure the load 
factor fee declines 0.07% (valid up 
to December 2007) 
No changes, applies previous one. 
   
Cont. Table 7—Discounts for selected pension fund managers from 1998 to 2007 
Banamex Bancomer  Profuturo  GNP  Inbursa 
No changes, applies previous 
one. 
From the 5th year of tenure, 
the load factor fee will be 
discounted 0.485%. This 
change applies between 2006 
and 2014 (valid up to 
December 2008) 
After having 1 year of tenure, the 
load factor fee decreases by 0.05%, 
in the second year 0.6%, in the third 
year 0.07%, in the fourth year 
0.03%, in the fifth year 0.83%, in 
the sixth year 0.08%, in the seventh 
year 0.10%, in the eight year 0.12%, 
in the ninth year 0.10%, and in the 
tenth year the load factor fee is 
eliminated (valid up to December 
2008) 
No changes, applies previous one. 






Table 8—Net number of switchers by main pension fund managers from 2000 to 2007 
 
AFORE  2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Banamex  7,632 78,576 254,208 376,879 430,885 263,678 145,302 396,704 
Bancomer  4,616 15,294 26,123  -9,427  -27,249 -78,249 -131,990 60,475 
Confia Principal  -1,911  -22,988 -95,114 -170,516 -198,007 -213,424  -285,431 -439,016
Ahorra  Ahora  -  -  - - - - -68  -7,699 
Argos  -  -  - - - - - 7,125 
Coppel  -  -  - - - - 23,250  131,920 
Scotia    -  -  - - - - 672  13,131 
Metlife  -  -  - - - 49,766  111,391  123,969 
HSBC  -  -  -  -  95,961  342,144 385,208 379,180 
Inbursa   1,161  -29,721 -131,821 -228,223 -278,795 -85,501  32,251  -156,304
ING -  -10,803 -35,076  -52,327  -118,975 -319,642  -448,446 -521,561
Azteca  -  -  -  -21,181 -78,574 -14,097 46,369  -126,723
Afirme  Bajio  -  -  - - - 71  25,886  2,228 
Invercap  -  -  - - - 43,577  179,625  319,932 
IXE  -  -  -  -  -5,721  -25,301 -23,782 -12,495 
Profuturo  GNP  -9,220  -18,688 55,883  218,365 405,693 429,081 366,297 281,202 
Solida  Banorte  Generali  82  7,579  69,715  142,894 181,295 249,192 378,555 296,566 
XXI 3,517  -7,150  -60,901  -155,220 -240,924 -303,279  -362,912 -369,763
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. The numbers in the cells are accumulated from the previous 12 months. – Refers to 
AFORES created after July 1997: Ahorra Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife (Mar-
2005), HSBC (Feb-2004),  ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-2004). 


























Table 9—Leavers by main pension fund managers from 2000 to 2007 
 
AFORE  2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007 
Banamex  10,588 19,995 76,435  158,166 381,353 847,546 1,471,159 1,934,706
Bancomer  19,292 66,084 159,605 291,502 501,662 883,448 1,456,443 1,878,266
Confia Principal  3,650  32,722 152,243 340,002 488,290 733,780  1,134,954 1,439,710
Ahorra  Ahora  -  -  - - - - 138  7,880 
Argos  -  -  - - - - -  892 
Coppel  -  -  - - - - 1,374  23,329 
Scotia    -  -  - - - - 0  2,132 
Metlife  -  -  - - - 2,192  33,984  97,676 
HSBC  - - -  -  210,764 334,914  615,039  830,514 
Inbursa   2,325  37,065 153,525 322,985 535,982 737,361  1,040,791 1,456,884
ING -  53,199 116,034 223,299 429,427 738,187  1,090,028 1,379,738
Azteca  - - -  37,295  149,652 256,906  453,357  657,765 
Afirme  Bajio  -  -  - - - 0 137  33,958 
Invercap  -  -  - - - 5,883  52,279  191,766 
IXE  - - -  -  9,632  42,986  70,520  94,947 
Profuturo  GNP  23,998 68,674 123,328 196,320 367,388 747,561 1,288,957 1,773,707
Solida Banorte Generali  9,853  43,602 86,350  132,486 252,642 487,897  872,322  1,263,419
XXI 790  30,933 127,127 283,368 440,357 591,444  793,887  973,901 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. The numbers in the cells are accumulated from the previous 12 months. – 
Refers to AFORES created after July 1997: Ahorra Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), 
Metlife (Mar-2005), HSBC (Feb-2004),  ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), Invercap (Mar-2005), 
IXE (Jul-2004). 
SOURCE: Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR).  
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Table 10— Individuals that moved from another AFORE by main pension fund managers 
from 2000 to 2007 
 
AFORE  2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007 
Banamex  18,220 98,571 330,643 535,045 812,238 1,111,224 1,616,461 2,331,410
Bancomer 23,908  81,378 185,728 282,075 474,413 805,199  1,324,453 1,938,741
Confia  Principal  1,739 9,738 57,129 169,486 290,283 520,356  849,523  1,000,694
Ahorra  Ahora  -  -  - - - -  70 181 
Argos  -  -  - - - -  -  8,017 
Coppel  -  -  - - - -  24,624  155,249 
Scotia    -  -  - - - -  0  15,263 
Metlife  -  -  - - - 51,958  145,375  221,645 
HSBC  - - -  -  306,725 677,058  1,000,247 1,209,694
Inbursa    3,486 7,344 21,704 94,162 257,187 651,860  1,073,042 1,300,580
ING  -  42,396 80,958  170,972 310,452 418,545 641,582 858,177 
Azteca  - - -  16,114  71,078  242,809  499,726  531,042 
Afirme  Bajio  -  -  - - - 71 26,023  36,186 
Invercap  -  -  - - - 49,460  231,904  511,698 
IXE  - - -  -  3,911  17,685  46,738  82,452 
Profuturo  GNP  14,778 49,986 179,211 414,685 773,081 1,176,642 1,655,254 2,054,909
Solida Banorte Generali  9,935  51,181 156,065 275,380 433,937 737,089  1,250,877 1,559,985
XXI  4,307 23,783 66,226 128,146 199,433 288,165  430,975  604,138 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. The numbers in the cells are accumulated from the previous 12 months. – Refers to 
AFORES created after July 1997: Ahorra Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife (Mar-
2005), HSBC (Feb-2004), ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-2004). 






Table 11— Investment portfolio composition of AFORES from 2000 to 2007 (%) 
 
  Government bonds Non-Government bonds  International
December 2000  91.10  8.90  - 
December 2001  87.85  12.15  - 
December 2002  83.10  16.90  - 
December 2003  82.30  17.70  - 
December  2004  82.60  17.40  - 
December 2005  82.15  16.85  1.61 
December 2006  72.81  17.20  10.01 
December  2007  69.00  21.03  9.92 
NOTE: Non-government bonds include corporate, financial institutions, and state’s debt. – Refers  
to instruments not allowed by the regulatory agency. 
                SOURCE: Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR). 
 
 
Table 12— Real rates of return SIEFORE 1 by main pension fund managers from 2000 to 2007(%)   
 
AFORE  2000 2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Banamex  8.08 12.21 5.05 1.71 1.71 8.76 4.77 2.96 
Bancomer  7.42 13.63 4.97 1.97 1.97 6.29 7.29 2.70 
Confia  Principal  7.99 13.00 5.27 1.82 1.82 7.07 8.13 1.84 
Ahorra  Ahora  - -  - - - - NA  2.42 
Argos  - -  - - - - - 2.18 
Coppel  - -  - - - - NA  3.50 
Scotia    - -  - - - - NA  3.50 
Metlife  - -  - - - NA  7.89  2.58 
HSBC  -  -  -  1.44 1.44 6.54 8.45 2.27 
Inbursa    7.62 11.36 3.86 2.76 2.76 6.48 4.27 3.85 
ING  -  -  5.00 1.90 1.90 7.61 7.38 2.21 
Azteca  -  -  -  2.42 2.42 7.23 4.99 2.75 
Afirme  Bajio  - -  - - - NA  7.07  3.40 
Invercap  - -  - - - NA  8.59  3.04 
IXE  - -  - - NA  NA  9.32  2.51 
Profuturo  GNP  7.70 12.46 5.69 1.71 1.71 8.36 8.55 2.11 
Solida  Banorte  Generali  7.73 13.29 6.00 1.28 1.28 6.82 7.84 3.20 
XXI  7.91 13.44 5.29 1.42 1.85 7.64 7.05 2.23 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December. NA is not available. – Refers to AFORES created after July 1997: Ahorra Ahora       
(Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), Metlife (Mar-2005), HSBC (Feb-2004),  ING (Dec-2001), 
Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005), Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-2004).  
    SOURCE: Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR). 






Table 13—Real rates of return SIEFORE 2 by main pension fund managers from 2004 to 2007 (%) 
 
AFORE  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Banamex 1.46  10.08 10.15 2.73 
Bancomer  1.72  6.73 8.33 1.74 
Confia Principal  1.58  8.38 9.49 1.51 
Ahorra Ahora  -  -  7.33  2.09 
Argos -  -  7.96  0.76 
Coppel -  -  9.99  4.15 
Scotia   -  -  7.93  3.11 
Metlife -  -  7.98  3.20 
HSBC  1.20  7.93 8.49 2.52 
Inbursa    2.51  7.13 4.63 3.96 
ING  1.40  8.70 9.62 2.37 
Azteca  2.17  7.40 7.13 1.81 
Afirme  Bajio  -  8.53 7.98 0.67 
Invercap -  13.90 11.24 2.17 
IXE  0.88  9.17 8.75 1.13 
Profuturo GNP  1.46  10.09 11.56 1.93 
Solida Banorte Generali 1.04  7.65  7.73  2.03 
XXI  1.61  9.67 9.29 1.66 
NOTE: All dates refer to the month of December.  – Refers to AFORES created after July 1997:    
Ahorra  Ahora (Sep-2006), Argos (Jan-2007), Coppel (Jan-2006), Scotia (Dec-2006), 
Metlife (Mar-2005), HSBC (Feb-2004),  ING (Dec-2001), Azteca (Apr-2003), Afirme Bajio (Dec-2005),  
Invercap (Mar-2005), IXE (Jul-2004). 
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        NOTE: Balance fees are an annual percentage. 
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Figure 11—Loss of pension funds due to load factor fees including discounts for tenure for a median 
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%
  
             SOURCE: Author’s calculation using data  from Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR).  
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SOURCE: Author’s calculation using data  from Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR). 
 